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To Defer or Not to Defer? 
Deference and Its Differential 
Impact on First Amendment 
Rights in the Roberts Court 
Clay Calvert † & Justin B. Hayes ‡ 
Abstract 
This Article examines the concept of deference as it affects First 
Amendment speech rights under the Roberts Court. Using six recent 
decisions as analytical springboards, including high-profile disputes in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n and Citizens United v. 
FEC, the Article illustrates that deference often determines a case’s 
outcome. The Article also demonstrates profound disagreements among 
the Justices on the use of deference in all six cases. Thus, like a spigot, 
deference is turned on and off by individual Justices, and even when 
turned on, it can flow freely or be reduced to a trickle. It is precisely 
such malleability that makes deference a critical concept on today’s 
Court when speech rights hang in the balance. Deference, the Article 
argues, muddies judicial analysis because it is a judicial wildcard that 
Justices can play—regardless of whether they purport to apply strict 
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review—to help sustain 
a law’s constitutionality and, in the process, sacrifice free speech. 
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Introduction 
More than a half-century ago, sociologist Erving Goffman defined 
deference as “that component of activity which functions as a 
symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed to a 
recipient of this recipient, or of something of which this recipient is 
taken as a symbol, extension, or agent.”1 But when courts engage in 
deference by acknowledging the wisdom, expertise, or understanding 
of others—be it legislative bodies, administrative agencies,2 
institutions, or individuals such as arbitrators,3 social scientists,4 and 
 
1. Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, 58 Am. 
Anthropologist 473, 477 (1956). 
2. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (“The fair 
measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has 
been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to 
the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative 
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (explaining the level of deference owed 
to an administrative agency’s construction of a statute that it 
administers, and noting that, in the absence of express congressional 
intent, the Court must determine if the agency has adopted “a 
permissible construction of the statute”). 
3. See, e.g., Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e 
start with the proposition that judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision 
in a labor dispute is extremely limited.”). 
4. See infra Part II.A (describing the majority’s abject lack of deference 
toward social scientists in Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 
2729 (2011)). 
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educators5—their actions are anything but symbolic. Deference grant-
ed and deference denied may, in fact, have profound constitutional 
implications that affect free speech rights and reflect on the duties of 
the judiciary.6 This is especially true when judicial deference involves 
blanket reliance on the authority of someone or something else to 
restrict constitutional rights.7  
On the other hand, deference seems essential in some situations. 
For instance, there is “widespread agreement that Congress’s deci-
sions warrant deference [by the Court] because it is a coequal branch 
that represents the popular will.”8 Similarly, when it comes to the 
President of the United States, former Chief Justice Warren Burger 
once wrote for a unanimous Court that “[t]he President’s need for 
complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference 
from the courts.”9 
This Article examines how deference—or the lack thereof—has 
significantly affected multiple First Amendment-based speech10 deci-
sions by the United States Supreme Court since John G. Roberts, Jr. 
became Chief Justice in September 2005. The sextet of cases analyzed 
here, starting with the most recent decision, are: (1) Brown v. 
 
5. See infra Part II.B (describing the majority’s grant of substantial 
deference to a public school principal’s interpretation of a message’s 
meaning in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)). 
6. For instance, Justice Antonin Scalia branded it “a striking abdication of 
judicial responsibility” for the U.S. Supreme Court to take as “binding” 
the views of the executive branch concerning the meaning of a statute or 
the views of Congress about the constitutionality of particular 
legislation. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 513–14. 
7. Cf. Howard Richards, Deference, 74 Ethics 135, 138–39 (1964) 
(“[Deference may] result in reliance on some authority. A may say, ‘I 
will defer to D’s judgment, since she seems to have a greater 
understanding of human emotions than I have.’ Or he may say, ‘I will 
ask my analyst and do what he says.’”). 
8. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and 
Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 893, 894–95 (2003). 
9. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).  
10. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in 
pertinent part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The Free 
Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety years 
ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as 
fundamental liberties that apply to state and local government entities 
and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) 
(explaining that freedom of speech and press are protected “from 
impairment by the States” by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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Entertainment Merchants Ass’n;11 (2) Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project;12 (3) Citizens United v. FEC;13 (4) FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc.;14 (5) Morse v. Frederick;15 and (6) Beard v. Banks.16 
These cases were selected for scrutiny because they  
◦ cover a factually diverse range of deference scenarios;  
◦ demonstrate deep disagreements among the justices when it 
comes to bestowing deference and, more specifically, to how 
much deference should be bestowed; and  
◦ illustrate the often negative consequences that granting 
substantial deference has on free speech interests.  
Although scores of law journal pages are filled with articles about 
general concepts like administrative deference,17 scant scholarship is 
devoted specifically to how deference affects First Amendment speech 
rights under the Roberts Court across a broad swath of free 
expression cases. The cases explored here stretch from governmental 
regulation of both violent video games (Brown) and broadcast 
indecency (Fox Television Stations) to laws or actions affecting 
national security (Humanitarian Law Project), political speech fund-
 
11. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
12. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
13. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
14. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox I ), 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
15. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
16. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006). 
17. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 
74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1671 (2007) (examining the lack of deference given 
by Judge Richard A. Posner to administrative judgments on 
immigration issues); Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back 
(But for How Long?): Justice Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the 
Supreme Court’s 2006 Term, 57 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2007) 
(examining the deployment of administrative deference by the Supreme 
Court and concluding that during the 2006 term, the Court “accorded 
administrative agencies more deference in the past year”); Emily 
Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 
Colum. L. Rev. 1722 (2011) (examining deference in the context of 
administrative law and, in particular, within the context of serial 
litigation in administrative law); Connor N. Raso & William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical 
Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 
Colum. L. Rev. 1727, 1817 (2010) (examining the deference regimes 
adopted by Supreme Court Justices, and concluding that “the Justices 
apply deference doctrine inconsistently, responding to their ideological 
preferences, the policies underlying the major deference regimes, and the 
preferences of Congress and the President”). 
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ing by corporations (Citizens United ), student speech (Morse ), and 
inmate expression (Beard ). 
Part I of this Article, drawing on literature from outside the law, 
initially examines and explicates deference.18 Part I then illustrates 
how the Supreme Court deployed deference in a broad array of First 
Amendment cases predating the Roberts Court.19 After providing this 
essential context, Part II analyzes the previously noted opinions 
rendered during Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure,20 concentrating on the 
different ways in which deference, or the lack thereof, affected the free 
speech interests at stake.21 
Finally, the Article concludes by asserting that deference, given 
the wide disagreements about it in each of the half-dozen cases 
analyzed here, constitutes a judicial wildcard that Justices can play 
when dealt a First Amendment hand. Specifically, deference is a 
malleable concept they can invoke, regardless of the name of the 
standard of review they purport to apply, to help ease the burden of 
sustaining a law’s constitutionality or, in the case of Morse, a 
government official’s censorial actions.22 Ultimately, the Article de-
monstrates that deference’s elasticity makes it ripe for misuse and 
abuse that often leave First Amendment rights hanging out to dry.23 
I. Explicating Deference and Its Role in  
First Amendment Jurisprudence 
This Part has two sections, the first of which provides a primer 
on deference, while the second explores how deference seeps into 
modern, yet pre-Roberts First Amendment jurisprudence. 
A. The Pervasive and Persuasive Nature of Deference 
Deference is a type of behavior that permeates human existence 
from an early age. Cornell University Professor Robert V. Presthus 
wrote more than fifty years ago that “from infancy on the individual 
is trained to defer to authority. He develops over time a generalized 
deference to the authority of parenthood, experience, knowledge, 
power, and status.”24 It thus comes as no surprise that deference 
infuses the legal system, in which multiple people and institutions 
 
18. See infra Part I.A. 
19. See infra Part I.B.  
20. See supra notes 11–16; infra Part II. 
21. See infra Part II. 
22. See infra Part II.B.  
23. See infra Conclusion. 
24. Robert V. Presthus, Toward a Theory of Organizational Behavior, 3 
Admin. Sci. Q. 48, 57 (1958). 
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hold positions of authority—from the Justices on the High Court to 
the members of Congress to the chairs of administrative agencies. 
Acts of deference constitute “status behaviors” based on honor 
and esteem.25 In particular, as sociology professor Brian Colwell 
observed, “[a]cts of deference communicate one person’s yielding of 
their own will, ideas, or interests to those of another, and by doing so, 
highlight the power and prestige differences between them.”26 
Although drawn from sociology, this description is relevant for the 
law because one must query whether it is constitutionally proper for 
Supreme Court Justices to yield their own will to the ideas of others. 
How much power, for example, should be bestowed on social scientists 
(Brown), educators (Morse), prison officials (Beard) or administrative 
agencies (Fox Television Stations) when First Amendment interests 
hang in the balance? 
Sociologists observe that “[d]eference is symbolic power in poten-
tial form: once deference is acquired, it can be deployed as the 
symbolic power to frame actions, situations, and events in ways that 
induce compliance and constitute the social order.”27 Here too one 
finds relevance for the study of judicial deference in free speech cases. 
One must consider, for instance, whether sanctioning social scientists 
with deference improperly vests them with too much power to influ-
ence judicial framing of censorship issues. A pivotal problem is the 
vast disconnect between social science frames and legal frames. 
Framing issues in terms of statistical significance, derived from tightly 
controlled—more derisively, contrived—experiments, simply does not 
comport with framing legal issues in terms of real-world injuries and 
the more subjective interests-of-justice balancing that transpire in 
First Amendment contexts.  
Although difficult to define from a legal perspective, deference 
generally “involves a decisionmaker (D1) setting aside its own judg-
ment and following the judgment of another decisionmaker (D2) in 
circumstances in which the deferring decisionmaker, D1, might have 
reached a different decision.”28 As Paul Horwitz encapsulated it, 
deference can be defined “as a decisionmaker’s decision to follow a 
determination made by some other individual or institution that it 
might not otherwise have reached had it decided the same question 
 
25. Brian Colwell, Deference or Respect? Status Management Practices 
Among Prison Inmates, 70 Soc. Psychol. Q. 442, 442 (2007). 
26. Id. at 443. 
27. Tim Hallett, Between Deference and Distinction: Interaction Ritual 
Through Symbolic Power in an Educational Institution, 70 Soc. 
Psychol. Q. 148, 149 (2007). 
28. Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1061, 1073 (2008). 
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independently.”29 Professors Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer 
offered an even simpler definition, writing that “we temporarily set 
aside the issue of the strength of deference and consider a deci-
sionmaker to have deferred whenever she takes someone else’s 
decision to be a reason for making the same decision.”30 
To the extent judicial deference is not mandated by another 
authority,31 it necessarily is discretionary.32 In such discretionary 
situations, when deference should be given, to whom deference should 
be given and how much deference should be given thus become key 
issues. Deference, in brief, is not binary but a matter of degree. In 
some areas of the law, it ranges on a continuum “from great respect 
at one end to near indifference at the other.”33 John Paul Stevens 
wrote in June 2010, shortly before his retirement from the Court,34 
that “[t]he degree to which we defer to a judgment by the political 
branches must vary up and down with the degree to which that 
judgment reflects considered, public-minded decisionmaking.”35 Cases 
thus often initially revolve around deciding what “the appropriate 
level of deference” is.36 
B. Deference and Free Speech 
Deference often influences cases involving the First Amendment 
freedom of speech, despite the High Court’s rather ringing statement 
more than thirty years ago in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. 
Virginia that “[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial 
 
29. Id. at 1078. 
30. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1363 (1997) (emphasis added). 
31. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 
Yale L.J. 969, 971 (1992) (describing the “principle of mandatory 
deference” in which “courts are compelled to defer to agency 
interpretations because Congress has directed them to defer”).  
32. See id. (explaining that in this model, courts defer in the name of 
“sound judicial decisionmaking”). 
33. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (internal 
citations omitted). 
34. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, Supreme 
Ct. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2012) (observing that “Justice Stevens retired from the 
Supreme Court on June 29, 2010”). 
35. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2830 n.3 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
36. See, e.g., Lopez v. Terrell, 654 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We 
determine first the appropriate level of deference to afford the agency’s 
interpretation . . . .”); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 124 
(2d Cir. 2011) (“It is worth reemphasizing that the primary thrust of 
our decision is whether the district court applied the appropriate level of 
deference when reviewing the arbitration award.”). 
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inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake.”37 For instance, 
when considering the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of 
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992 in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy observed that predictive judgments by Congress must be 
given substantial deference.38 The Court’s role in such cases, Kennedy 
opined, is only to ensure that Congress drew reasonable inferences 
based on substantial evidence.39 He added that “substantiality is to be 
measured in this context by a standard more deferential than we 
accord to judgments of an administrative agency.”40 Such vast defer-
ence is granted because of both congressional expertise41 and 
separation-of-power concerns regarding respect for congressional au-
thority. As Justice Kennedy put it: 
We owe Congress’ findings an additional measure of deference 
out of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative power. 
Even in the realm of First Amendment questions where 
Congress must base its conclusions upon substantial evidence, 
deference must be accorded to its findings as to the harm to be 
avoided and to the remedial measures adopted for that end, lest 
we infringe on traditional legislative authority to make predic-
tive judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy.42 
Subsequent to Turner, the Supreme Court in Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale considered whether a New Jersey public 
accommodations law that required the Boy Scouts to admit a gay 
adult as an assistant scoutmaster violated “the Boy Scouts’ First 
Amendment right of expressive association.”43 In concluding this right 
was indeed violated, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote for the 
majority that “[a]s we give deference to an association’s assertions 
regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to 
an association’s view of what would impair its expression.”44 Professor 
Nat Stern thus wrote that “Dale proclaimed a doctrine of deference to 
 
37. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978). 
38. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997).  
39. Id.  
40. Id.  
41. See id. at 196 (“Though different in degree, the deference to Congress is 
in one respect akin to deference owed to administrative agencies because 
of their expertise.” (emphasis added)). 
42. Id.  
43. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).  
44. Id. at 653. 
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both an association’s assertion of the substance of its message and its 
view of conditions for preserving that expression.”45 
Rehnquist’s position revealed a deep division, however, among the 
Justices on the intersection of deference and First Amendment rights. 
In a dissent joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
and Stephen Breyer, John Paul Stevens called Rehnquist’s belief 
about deference 
an astounding view of the law. I am unaware of any previous 
instance in which our analysis of the scope of a constitutional 
right was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his 
or her brief and inquiring no further. It is even more astonishing 
in the First Amendment area, because, as the majority itself 
acknowledges, “we are obligated to independently review the 
factual record.” It is an odd form of independent review that 
consists of deferring entirely to whatever a litigant claims.46  
Dale plainly illustrates that whether and when to grant deference 
in First Amendment disputes is not a task on which all Justices agree 
in all cases. In fact, as Part II of this Article illustrates, disagreements 
on deference have pervaded multiple high-profile speech cases since 
John Roberts first donned the Chief Justice’s robes in late 2005. 
Indeed, deference is a notion over which today’s Justices often badly 
fracture.  
In another First Amendment context, the Court is wary of 
granting too much deference. This is the situation when administra-
tive agencies involved in licensing and permit cases create schemes 
conferring upon themselves too much discretion to curb speech.47 In 
the context of administrative law, deference, as Professor James T. 
O’Reilly wrote, can be loosely defined “as the willingness of a court to 
accept an agency’s interpretations of a statute or policy over 
competing interpretations offered by regulated persons or public 
interest groups.”48 
The various tests and rules the Supreme Court uses to measure 
the constitutional validity of restrictions on speech also reflect what 
might be considered built-in levels of deference. For instance, the 
Court’s time, place, and manner jurisprudence involving intermediate 
 
45. Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 Buff. 
L. Rev. 847, 911 (2011).  
46. Dale, 530 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
47. Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative 
Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 2029, 
2049 (2011). 
48. James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: 
Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 
Cornell L. Rev. 939, 941 (2008). 
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scrutiny has been characterized by First Amendment scholar Kathleen 
Sullivan as “relatively deferential.”49 In contrast, the strict scrutiny 
standard of review50 that typically applies to content-based re-
strictions on speech is far less deferential.51 
But even when they interpret the meaning of (and apply) a 
relatively deferential test like intermediate scrutiny, the Justices 
sometimes still disagree on how much deference should be afforded to 
another body or institution. For instance, in Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism the majority upheld a noise-amplification restriction imposed 
on a bandshell in New York City’s Central Park as a permissible 
time, place, and manner regulation.52 In doing so, the majority 
chastised the lower appellate court for “failing to defer to the city’s 
reasonable determination that its interest in controlling volume would 
be best served by requiring bandshell performers to utilize the city’s 
sound technician.”53 In addition, the majority held that intermediate 
scrutiny does not require a government entity to adopt “the least 
restrictive or least intrusive means”54 of serving a substantial interest 
but, rather, only that “the means chosen are not substantially broader 
than necessary to achieve the government’s interest.”55  
In sharp contrast, Justice Thurgood Marshall, in a dissent joined 
by Justices William Brennan and John Paul Stevens, found the 
majority’s analysis in Ward far too deferential: 
 
49. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution, and City Regulation 
of Speech, 25 Hastings Const. L.Q. 209, 217 (1998).  
50. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 
(2000) (“[A] content-based speech restriction . . . can stand only if it 
satisfies strict scrutiny. If a statute regulates speech based on its content, 
it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government 
interest.” (citation omitted)); see also Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict 
Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 743, 745 (2003) (“Under the guise of 
strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment 
to require that state actors imposing a content-based restriction on 
speech prove that the restriction (1) advances a compelling government 
interest, and (2) is narrowly tailored to achieve that end. The Court 
includes under the latter prong an inquiry into whether the state action 
in question offers the least restrictive means of achieving the state’s 
allegedly compelling interest.” (footnote omitted)). 
51. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent 
with it.”). 
52. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
53. Id. at 800. 
54. Id. at 798.  
55. Id. at 800. 
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Until today, a key safeguard of free speech has been govern-
ment’s obligation to adopt the least intrusive restriction 
necessary to achieve its goals. By abandoning the requirement 
that time, place, and manner regulations must be narrowly 
tailored, the majority replaces constitutional scrutiny with man-
datory deference. The majority’s willingness to give government 
officials a free hand in achieving their policy ends extends so far 
as to permit, in this case, government control of speech in 
advance of its dissemination.56 
Commercial speech57 is also subject to a more relaxed form of 
intermediate scrutiny,58 but here again Justices sometimes split on the 
appropriate degree of deference that must be given. For instance, in 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,59 which involved a restriction 
on billboards due partly to aesthetic concerns, Justice Byron White 
sparred with then-Justice Rehnquist. White wrote that despite 
Rehnquist’s belief that the essence of democracy involves deference to 
legislative judgments that distinguish between categories of content, 
“it has been this Court’s consistent position that democracy stands on 
a stronger footing when courts protect First Amendment interests 
against legislative intrusion, rather than deferring to merely rational 
legislative judgments in this area.”60 In White’s view, Rehnquist 
“misconceive[d] the nature of the judicial function in this situation.”61 
 
56. Id. at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
57. What constitutes commercial speech is not easily defined, with the U.S. 
Supreme Court observing “the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will 
clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.” City of 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993). See 
Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism 
and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 Loy. L.A. L. 
Rev. 67, 74 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has cryptically offered a 
number of different—and not always consistent—definitions of 
commercial speech . . . .”). 
58. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 
1339 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court “held that restrictions on 
nonmisleading commercial speech regarding lawful activity must 
withstand intermediate scrutiny”); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 
U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the 
intermediate scrutiny applied in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)); see also Tamara R. Piety, 
Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the 
Problem that Won’t Go Away, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 181, 182 (2007) 
(“[T]he commercial speech doctrine creates a category of speech subject 
to intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.”). 
59. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality 
opinion). 
60. Id. at 519. 
61. Id. at 520. 
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Also weighing in with White on the side of a less deferential approach 
was Justice William Brennan, who observed that “[o]f course, it is not 
for a court to impose its own notion of beauty on San Diego. But 
before deferring to a city’s judgment, a court must be convinced that 
the city is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic con-
cerns with respect to its environment.”62 
Rehnquist, however, took an opposite tack—one of extreme 
deference: 
I do not think a city should be put to the task of convincing a 
local judge that the elimination of billboards would have more 
than a negligible impact on aesthetics. Nothing in my experi-
ence on the bench has led me to believe that a judge is in any 
better position than a city or county commission to make 
decisions in an area such as aesthetics.63 
Indeed, when it comes to matters such as aesthetics in considering 
whether they constitute important or substantial interests under 
intermediate scrutiny, attorney Darrel C. Menthe recently wrote that 
“the legitimacy of such justifications largely depends on deference to 
legislative pronouncements of purpose. There is rarely any strong 
connection between the stated purpose and the effects of the 
legislation.”64 
In 1991, the Justices again disagreed on deference, this time in 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada65 when considering the constitutional-
ity of state rules restricting extrajudicial statements by Nevada 
attorneys. Justice Kennedy captured well the disagreement in Gentile 
as to whether to defer to the professional judgment of the State Bar 
of Nevada in disciplining its attorneys for their exercise of speech. He 
wrote that “[w]e have not in recent years accepted our colleagues’ 
apparent theory . . . that we will defer to professional bodies when 
those restrictions impinge upon First Amendment freedoms.”66 In 
other words, Kennedy suggested that when free speech interests are at 
stake, deference should not be given to professional organizations such 
as a state bar. In opposition to this view, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
opined that 
 
62. Id. at 531 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
63. Id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
64. Darrel C. Menthe, Aesthetic Regulation and the Development of First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 225, 228 (2010) 
(emphasis added). 
65. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
66. Id. at 1054.  
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[t]he State Bar of Nevada, which made its own factual findings, 
and the Supreme Court of Nevada, which upheld those findings, 
were in a far better position than we are to appreciate the likely 
effect of petitioner’s statements on potential members of a jury 
panel in a highly publicized case such as this.67 
This Part of the Article made it apparent that deference is an 
extremely pliable concept upon which Justices often disagree, both as 
to whether it should be bestowed and, if so, the level or quantum of 
deference that should be granted. With this background in mind, the 
Article now examines six First Amendment cases—all decided during 
John Roberts’s tenure as chief justice—to better understand both 
when and how deference is deployed by the Court and on whom it is 
bestowed. Perhaps more importantly, they reveal how deference given 
and deference denied affect freedom of speech today. 
II. Free Speech Rulings Under the Roberts Court:  
Six Cases Illustrate Varying Degrees of  
Deference and Disagreements Among the Justices  
This Part analyzes a half-dozen decisions by the Roberts Court 
affecting First Amendment speech rights in which the Justices frac-
tured on the level of deference—if any—that should be extended to 
another entity, institution, or individual. Each case demonstrates 
divisions among the Justices on deference that sometimes are reflected 
in back-and-forth exchanges across majority, plurality, and dissenting 
opinions.  
A. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n:  
Should Deference Be Given to Social Scientists? 
The case that perhaps best illustrates the split among the current 
Justices on deference is the most recent one examined here, Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n.68 The deference issue in Brown actu-
ally was double layered. The first level involved the extent of defer-
ence the Justices should give to the expertise and findings of social 
scientists when it comes to the alleged harms caused by playing 
violent video games. The second layer, in turn, centered on how much 
deference the Justices should grant to the legislative bodies (in this 
case, the California legislature) that rely on such social science 
evidence in adopting legislation.  
As explained later, the majority in Brown granted no deference to 
the findings of the social scientists in declaring California’s violent 
video game law unconstitutional.69 That law required the labeling,  
67. Id. at 1080 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
68. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
69. See infra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
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with a solid white “18” outlined in black, of all violent video games 
imported into or distributed in the Golden State,70 and also made it 
an offense, punishable by a maximum $1,000 fine,71 to “sell or rent a 
video game that has been labeled as a violent video game to a 
minor.”72 The social science research that California contended sup-
ported the law in Brown consisted largely of work by Iowa State 
University’s Dr. Craig Anderson.73 
Stephen Breyer, it turned out, was the lone Justice to defer both 
to the social scientists and to California lawmakers, like Leland Yee, 
who relied on social science data in proposing the law at issue in 
Brown.74 Breyer did this despite acknowledging disagreements among 
social scientists as to whether playing violent video games causes 
harm. In a key paragraph, Justice Breyer opined: 
Like many, perhaps most, studies of human behavior, each 
study has its critics, and some of those critics have produced 
studies of their own in which they reach different conclusions. (I 
list both sets of research in the appendixes.) I, like most judges, 
lack the social science expertise to say definitively who is right. 
But associations of public health professionals who do possess 
that expertise have reviewed many of these studies and found a 
significant risk that violent video games, when compared with 
more passive media, are particularly likely to cause children 
harm.75 
In other words, Justice Breyer deferred, letting associations of 
public health professionals serve as arbiters of the value and merit of 
 
70. Cal. Civ. Code § 1746.2 (West 2009). 
71. See id. § 1746.3 (“Any person who violates any provision of this title 
shall be liable in an amount of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000), or a 
lesser amount as determined by the court. However, this liability shall 
not apply to any person who violates those provisions if he or she is 
employed solely in the capacity of a salesclerk or other, similar position 
and he or she does not have an ownership [or managerial] interest in the 
business . . . .”). 
72. Id. § 1746.1(a). 
73. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188 
RMW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57472, at *31 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007) 
(noting that California “relie[d] heavily on the work of Dr. Anderson”), 
aff’d, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
74. When California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed Assembly Bill 
1179 into law in October 2005, Yee asserted that “[s]tudy upon study 
shows that these ultraviolent games have harmful effects on our 
children.” John M. Broder, Bill is Signed to Restrict Video Games in 
California, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2005, at A11. 
75. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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social science data produced by researchers such as Dr. Anderson. 
Breyer, for instance, cited reports and statements by groups including 
the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychological As-
sociation, the American Medical Association, and the American 
Academy of Family Physicians.76 
Breyer followed up this substantial serving of deference to re-
search and professional experts with a heaping helping of deference to 
the legislative body that relied on those experts: 
Unlike the majority, I would find sufficient grounds in these 
studies and expert opinions for this Court to defer to an elected 
legislature’s conclusion that the video games in question are par-
ticularly likely to harm children. This Court has always thought it 
owed an elected legislature some degree of deference in respect to 
legislative facts of this kind, particularly when they involve tech-
nical matters that are beyond our competence, and even in First 
Amendment cases.77 
Justice Breyer’s deferential approach is extremely significant for 
three main reasons. First and most obvious, Breyer’s deference would 
have resulted in a pro-censorship decision upholding California’s law 
had he been able to gather support for his views from enough of his 
fellow Justices in Brown. The expertise of social scientists, at least in 
terms of proving harms to minors, would have been sufficient to 
trump the First Amendment rights of those same minors, along with 
the speech rights of those who create and distribute violent video 
games. 
Second, Breyer’s deference to social scientists involves a two-step 
methodology. Specifically, Breyer did not defer directly to individual 
social scientists such as Dr. Anderson. Instead, Breyer relied on the 
review, vetting, and analysis of their work by learned organizations. 
In other words, he depended on the stamp of approval or the 
imprimatur of organizations such as the American Academy of Pedi-
atrics and the American Psychological Association.78 Thus, while 
individual social scientists themselves may possess expertise, Breyer 
did not bow to that expertise until larger bodies, composed of 
multiple experts, endorsed or otherwise gave their stamp of approval 
to that research. 
Third, Breyer demonstrated a willingness to defer to the judg-
ment of the abovementioned learned organizations despite recognizing 
a disagreement among individual social scientists about whether 
playing violent video games causes harm.79 In brief, a discrepancy  
76. Id. at 2769–70. 
77. Id. at 2770 (emphasis added). 
78. Id. at 2769–70. 
79. Id. at 2769. 
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among experts at the individual or micro level did not bother Breyer 
because, at the organizational or macro level, there was agreement 
among a cadre of experts. This appears to be a quite realistic 
approach in terms of embracing social science research because 
disagreements among social scientists seem inevitable. 
In stark contrast, the five-Justice majority, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice Antonin Scalia and joined by Justices Anthony 
Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, 
offered social scientists no deference or slack. Justice Scalia wrote that 
social science evidence must be “compelling”80 and entail more than 
“ambiguous proof”81 in order to demonstrate, with a “degree of 
certitude,”82 the existence of an “actual problem.”83 Furthermore, 
Scalia was clear that social scientists must produce data that possess 
real-world generalizability84 such that they demonstrate more than 
“minuscule real-world effects, such as children’s feeling more aggres-
sive or making louder noises in the few minutes after playing a violent 
game than after playing a nonviolent game.”85 Justice Scalia 
emphasized that contrived experiments conducted by social scientists 
can be so far removed from legal issues as to be irrelevant. For 
example, he wrote that one study cited by California 
found that children who had just finished playing violent video 
games were more likely to fill in the blank letter in ‘explo_e’ 
with a ‘d’ (so that it reads ‘explode’) than with an ‘r’ 
(‘explore’). The prevention of this phenomenon, which might 
have been anticipated with common sense, is not a compelling 
state interest.86 
In summary, Brown indicates a dramatic disconnect among the 
current Justices on the deference that should be accorded to social 
scientists and, more specifically, to their research findings. Justice 
Breyer’s embrace of a deferential approach—one that tolerates am-
biguity in research findings and defers to the seal of approval granted 
by learned organizations—led him to pen a dissent that cuts deeply 
 
80. See id. at 2739 (majority opinion) (“The State’s evidence is not 
compelling.”). 
81. Id. (“[A]mbiguous proof will not suffice.”). 
82. Id. at 2739 n.8. 
83. Id. at 2738 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 
803, 822 (2000)). 
84. External validity is “the measure of a particular study’s 
generalizability.” Jennings Bryant & Susan Thompson, 
Fundamentals of Media Effects 15 (1st ed. 2002). 
85. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739. 
86. Id. at 2739 n.7 (citation omitted). 
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against First Amendment freedoms. In contrast, the majority’s 
rigorous demands imposed on social scientists and their research—a 
decidedly non-deferential approach—led to a pro-free speech result. 
Deference—or, more accurately, the lack thereof—thus proved critical 
in Brown. 
Justice Scalia and the majority must be lauded for not being 
deferentially blinded, as it were, by science.87 It often is difficult not 
to be blinded because, as Professor Elaine E. Sutherland wrote in 
2006 when considering the persuasiveness of expert scientific 
testimony: 
Science is perceived as solid, knowable, measurable: in short, 
science offers certainty. These factors combine to place the 
person who does understand science, the expert, in an incredibly 
powerful position. After all, if one is coming from a position of 
ignorance, the person who holds the key to that certain body of 
knowledge is something of a savior.88 
Whether future decisions involving the consideration of social 
science evidence by the Roberts Court come down hard on social 
scientists or whether they adopt the far more deferential stance of 
Justice Breyer remains to be seen. 
B. Morse v. Frederick: Deference to Educators 
 in Interpreting an Ambiguous Message’s Meaning 
When it comes to students’ speech rights, there is a widely held 
assumption or perception that courts inevitably will defer to the 
judgments of school officials.89 But this has not always been the case. 
Most notably, Justice Hugo Black found himself isolated in dissent in 
the seminal student-speech case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District90 when he called for unbridled judicial 
deference to the decisions of school authorities.91 
 
87. Cf. Thomas Dolby, She Blinded Me with Science, on The Best of 
Thomas Dolby: Retrospectacle (EMI 1994) (singing, in early new 
wave fashion, “she blinded me with science and failed me in biology”). 
88. Elaine E. Sutherland, Undue Deference to Experts Syndrome?, 16 Ind. 
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 375, 381–82 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
89. See, e.g., Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students Are “Persons” 
Under Our Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 1323, 1348 (2009) (remarking on “the extraordinary deference that 
is afforded to administrators in managing school affairs and the 
relatively low value afforded to the speech of young people” (emphasis 
added)). 
90. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
91. Criticizing the Tinker majority’s ruling in favor of the First Amendment 
speech rights of public school students, Justice Black wrote that “the 
Court arrogates to itself, rather than to the State’s elected officials 
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Fast-forward to the Roberts Court and, more specifically, to five 
years ago in Morse v. Frederick.92 That’s when the Justices faced a 
student-speech controversy involving a banner that cryptically,93 albeit 
somewhat amusingly, bore the message “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.”94 A key 
issue in the case was the meaning of this sign, with its student-
creator, Joseph Frederick, claiming “the words were just nonsense 
meant to attract television cameras”95 and that it was “meaningless 
and funny.”96 Principal Deborah Morse, however, believed it “would 
be construed by students, District personnel, parents and others 
witnessing the display of the banner, as advocating or promoting 
illegal drug use.”97 
In ruling in favor of the principal’s decision to suspend Frederick 
and, in the process, in favor of the principal’s interpretation of the 
meaning of the 420ish-turned phrase98 “Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” Chief 
Justice John Roberts deferred on the pivotal question of meaning to 
Deborah Morse’s interpretation. In particular, the Chief Justice la-
beled her understanding “plainly a reasonable one.”99 Deference to the 
principal’s interpretation under this very lax reasonableness stand-
ard,100 in turn, resulted in a pro-censorship decision. This came 
despite Chief Justice Roberts’s frank acknowledgement that 
 
charged with running the schools, the decision as to which school 
disciplinary regulations are ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 517 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). Black blasted this “permissiveness in this 
country fostered by the judiciary” in allowing students to “defy and 
flout orders of school officials to keep their minds on their own 
schoolwork.” Id. at 518. 
92. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  
93. Id. at 401 (“The message on Frederick’s banner is cryptic.”). 
94. See id. at 397 (explaining that student Joseph Frederick and his friends, 
while standing across the street from Juneau-Douglas High School as the 
Olympic Torch Relay passed through Juneau, Alaska, “unfurled a 14-
foot banner bearing the phrase: ‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS’”). 
95. Id. at 401 (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 
2006)).  
96. Id. at 402 (quoting Morse, 439 F.3d at 1116).  
97. Id. at 401. 
98. Cf. Colleen O’Connor & John Ingold, A Number of Things to Rally 
Around at 420, Denver Post, Apr. 21, 2010, at 1B ( “The term ‘420,’ 
now street slang for marijuana use, was first used by a group of San 
Rafael, Calif., high school students to refer to the time they’d meet after 
school to smoke dope. The annual pot celebration is held April 20.”). 
99. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401.  
100. Justice Thomas wrote elsewhere that “[i]t was reasonable for her to 
conclude that the banner promoted illegal drug use.” Id. at 410 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
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“[g]ibberish is surely a possible interpretation of the words on the 
banner.”101 The Morse majority’s decision to accede to the principal’s 
interpretation of meaning thus is consistent with what Professor Lee 
Goldman called in 2011 the Court’s “increasing deference to the 
choices made by school administrators” since Tinker.102 
John Paul Stevens, however, dissented in Morse. A key part of his 
dissent questioned the deference bestowed to Principal Morse’s 
interpretation. As Stevens wrote, “it is one thing to restrict speech 
that advocates drug use. It is another thing entirely to prohibit an 
obscure message with a drug theme that a third party subjectively—
and not very reasonably—thinks is tantamount to express 
advocacy.”103 The third party here, of course, is Deborah Morse, and 
the obscure message is “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.” Criticizing the majority’s 
approach to meaning, Stevens added that “[o]n occasion, the Court 
suggests it is deferring to the principal’s ‘reasonable’ judgment that 
Frederick’s sign qualified as drug advocacy. At other times, the Court 
seems to say that it thinks the banner’s message constitutes express 
advocacy. Either way, its approach is indefensible.”104 Stevens, in 
brief, refused to grant Principal Morse’s interpretation of meaning any 
deference and, instead, concluded that the banner’s “silly” and 
“nonsensical” messages should be protected by the First Amendment.105 
As with Brown, Morse reveals the power of deference to affect 
free speech rights. In particular, deference granted would have re-
sulted in censorship in both Brown (had the Court adopted Justice 
Breyer’s deferential stance to social scientists in his dissent) and 
Morse (where the majority did, in fact, defer to the principal’s inter-
pretation of the message), while deference denied would lead to First 
Amendment victories in both cases (as it did in Brown, where the 
majority granted no deference to the expertise of either social 
scientists or the state legislature, and as it would have in Morse had 
Justice Stevens’s dissent been able to carry the day). Both cases, in 
turn, reveal that the Justices are not unified when it comes to grant-
ing deference to either social scientists or public school administrators. 
Does the majority’s deference to public school educators in Morse 
square with prior student-speech decisions? In a post-Morse article, 
Professor Aaron H. Caplan of Loyola Law School in Los Angeles 
asserts that the Supreme Court’s analysis nearly seventy years ago in 
the flag-salute case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
 
101. Id. at 402 (majority opinion).  
102. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A 
Comprehensive Approach, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 395, 398 (2011). 
103. Morse, 551 U.S. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
104. Id. at 441 (first emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  
105. Id. at 446.  
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Barnette106 features its most lengthy, intense statement on deference 
to educators.107 The Barnette majority made readily apparent that it 
would not grant blanket deference to educators, opining that school 
boards are imbued with 
important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none 
that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of 
Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is 
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of 
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its 
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our 
government as mere platitudes.108 
On the other hand, a majority of the Court in 1975 made it 
evident that some deference is owed to educators, noting that “[t]he 
system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies 
necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators 
and school board members.”109 
Perhaps the pre-Morse decision that best illustrates an unsettled 
notion of deference to public school educators is Bethel School District 
No. 403 v. Fraser.110 In upholding school officials’ right to punish a 
student for giving a speech packed with sexual innuendoes to a 
captive audience of minors,111 the majority of the Court opined that 
“[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in 
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board” 
and “schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the 
essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a 
school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct 
such as that indulged in by this confused boy.”112 
Yet, in a concurring opinion apparently designed to rein in 
deference to educators, Justice William Brennan wrote that school 
officials do not possess “limitless discretion to apply their own notions 
 
106. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
107. Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 Wash. 
L. Rev. 71, 89 (2010) (“Justice [Felix] Frankfurter’s cries for deference 
to school administrators were relegated to a fretful dissent in Barnette, 
and no subsequent Supreme Court decision about student speech rights 
has restated it at similar length or intensity.” (footnote omitted)). 
108. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added). 
109. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (emphasis added). 
110. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).  
111. See id. at 677 (observing that student Matthew Fraser delivered a 
speech nominating a fellow student for student elective office in front of 
about 600 students, and noting that Fraser described “his candidate in 
terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor”). 
112. Id. at 683. 
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of indecency. Courts have a First Amendment responsibility to insure 
that robust rhetoric . . . is not suppressed by prudish failures to 
distinguish the vigorous from the vulgar . . . .”113 Two years after 
Fraser, Brennan, joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry 
Blackmun, again dissented in a student-speech case, Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier.114 Brennan wrote that while the Court generally 
defers to local school boards on the daily operations of school systems, 
“[w]e have not, however, hesitated to intervene where their decisions 
run afoul of the Constitution.”115 Demonstrating no deference to the 
decision of the principal in Kuhlmeier to censor articles relating to 
students’ experiences with pregnancy and the impact of divorce on 
students, Brennan brusquely wrote that the principal 
objected to some material in two articles, but excised six entire 
articles. He did not so much as inquire into obvious alternatives, 
such as precise deletions or additions (one of which had already 
been made), rearranging the layout, or delaying publication. 
Such unthinking contempt for individual rights is intolerable 
from any state official. It is particularly insidious from one to 
whom the public entrusts the task of inculcating in its youth an 
appreciation for the cherished democratic liberties that our 
Constitution guarantees.116 
Such language reflects a decided lack of deference to school 
officials. It thus is clear that the split on deference in Morse regarding 
the meaning of “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” is nothing new but instead 
reflects long-standing differences among various Justices in the student-
speech arena. 
While a majority of Justices in Morse certainly embraced defer-
ence, the dissent of Justice Stevens, which was joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Souter, demonstrates that deference is neither auto-
matic nor uniformly agreed upon in educational settings. One thing is 
clear, however: when deference is bestowed on school officials, it 
 
113. Id. at 689–90 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of 
Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)). 
114. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). This case 
involved censorship in a high school newspaper of student-written articles 
about pregnancy and divorce. The majority held that “educators do not 
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style 
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so 
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.” Id. at 273. The majority suggested such pedagogical concerns 
include “speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, 
inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or 
unsuitable for immature audiences.” Id. at 271. 
115. Id. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
116. Id. at 290 (emphasis added). 
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results in censorship. Judicial pushback from the likes of Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Souter in Morse thus is essential as a bulwark to 
safeguard student expression from the censorial proclivities of school 
officials in a post-Columbine world.117 
C. Citizens United v. FEC: Deference Denied to  
Congress Opens Spending Spigots for Political  Speech 
One of the most controversial118 First Amendment-based decisions 
during the Roberts Court was its 2010 fractured ruling in Citizens 
United v. FEC.119 Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of 
the Court: (1) overruling Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Com-
merce;120 (2) holding that “[t]he Government may regulate corporate 
political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it 
may not suppress that speech altogether;”121 and (3) striking down a 
federal law restricting corporate independent expenditures prior to 
elections.122 
These results, this Section argues, reflect a rejection of deference 
by a majority of the Justices in Citizens United on two distinct levels: 
 
117. See generally Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for 
Bashing Principals, Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech 
Issue the Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 First Amend. L. Rev. 
210, 243–44 (2008) (“[S]ince the tragedy at Columbine High School in 
April 1999, courts have granted vast deference to school officials when it 
comes to squelching any speech that can be perceived as a threat of 
violence.” (footnote omitted)). 
118. For instance, the Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United has been 
compared with the Court’s infamous decision in Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. 393 (1857), that treated blacks as property rather than citizens. 
Current U.S. Senator and erstwhile presidential candidate John Kerry 
called Citizens United “the worst, the most dangerous decision in the 
country since Dred Scott.” Alex Leary, Attack Ads Grow with Rise of 
the Super PAC, St. Petersburg Times (Fla.), July 24, 2011, at 1A. 
And Duke Thomas, the founder of a political action committee called 
“We Are the 99% Movement,” said, “Citizens United is the worst 
decision for this country since Dred Scott. Saying corporations are 
people is as bad as saying people are property.” Luke Rosiak, The Super 
PAC to End All Super PACs?, Wash. Times, Feb. 6, 2012, at A3. 
119. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
120. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). In 
Austin, the Court upheld a Michigan statute that required corporations 
to make all independent political expenditures through a segregated 
fund consisting of money solicited expressly for political purposes 
because the law “reduces the threat that huge corporate treasuries 
amassed with the aid of favorable state laws will be used to influence 
unfairly the outcome of elections.” Id. at 669. 
121. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886. 
122. Id. at 917. 
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◦ rejection of deference to congressional action that was taken 
in the name of remedying perceived flaws in political speech 
marketplaces; and  
◦ rejection of the deference accorded to prior decisions that is 
embodied in the principle of stare decisis, at least when those 
prior decisions conflict with long-standing principles of First 
Amendment theory. 
The central issue in Citizens United involved the constitutionality 
of portions of a federal law123 prohibiting corporations from using 
general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for elec-
tioneering communications and for speech expressly advocating the 
election or defeat of a candidate.124 Also at issue was a related series 
of FEC regulations that were so complex they would, as Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney, 
conduct demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings 
before discussing the most salient political issues of our day.”125 The 
overall effect was to make it “a felony for all corporations—including 
nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering commu-
nications within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a 
general election.”126 
In declaring the law unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy perfunc-
torily referenced the “due deference”127 that must be given to 
Congress and acknowledged that the Court “must give weight to 
attempts by Congress”128 to remedy perceived problems. In this case, 
those congressionally identified problems were the alleged “corruption 
or its appearance”129 that corporate political speech might cause on 
elections and that, in turn, a ban on corporate expenditures might 
prevent.  
But Justice Kennedy quickly made it clear in the same paragraph 
that such deference is not extensive, at least when: (1) the speech is 
 
123. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. 
Ct. 876 (2010). 
124. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (“Federal law prohibits corporations 
and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent 
expenditures for speech defined as an ‘electioneering communication’ or 
for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.”). 
125. Id. at 889. 
126. Id. at 897. 
127. Id. at 911. 
128. Id.  
129. Id. at 908. 
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political; (2) the imposed sanctions are criminal;130 and (3) congres-
sional action conflicts with supposedly long-standing First 
Amendment principles. After stating the obvious—“Congress may not 
choose an unconstitutional remedy”131—Kennedy elaborated that 
congressional remedial action “must comply with the First Amend-
ment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, 
is the governing rule. An outright ban on corporate political speech 
during the critical pre-election period is not a permissible remedy.”132  
In brief—and, at least, in Justice Kennedy’s view—the congres-
sionally imposed remedy for its anticorruption interest could not 
permissibly take the form of a speech-reducing statute due to its 
conflict with the time-honored counterspeech doctrine133 that Congress 
chose to ignore. As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote for the High Court 
eighty-five years ago: “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion 
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of 
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence.”134 In summary, the congressional action at issue in Citizens 
United conflicted with long-standing First Amendment theory and, in 
turn, the First Amendment theory of “more speech, not less”135 
simply had to prevail. 
In addition, much like Justice Scalia (with whom Kennedy joined) 
in Brown lambasted social science for failing to demonstrate causal 
evidence of any harm to minors,136 Kennedy in Citizens United found 
that Congress offered “only scant evidence that independent 
expenditures even ingratiate,”137 much less corrupt.138 In other words, 
just as the non-deferential approach of Justice Scalia in Brown lead to 
his conclusion that there was no evidence of any problem that 
justified remedial legislative action, so too did Justice Kennedy’s 
deference-light approach in Citizens United result in a determination 
 
130. On this point, Kennedy wrote that “under our law and our tradition it 
seems stranger than fiction for our Government to make this political 
speech a crime. Yet this is the statute’s purpose and design.” Id. at 917. 
131. Id. at 911. 
132. Id. (emphasis added). 
133. See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: 
A New Look at the Old Remedy for “Bad” Speech, 2000 BYU L. Rev. 
553 (discussing the counterspeech doctrine and providing examples of its 
use). 
134. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
135. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (emphasis added). 
136. See supra Part II.A. 
137. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910. 
138. See id. (“Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption.”). 
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that there was no evidence demonstrating an actual problem requiring 
legislative redress existed. 
University of Chicago Law School Professor Aziz Z. Huq recently 
observed that “the Citizens United Court pointed to a specific absence 
of evidence that the asserted government interest was furthered by 
the corporate expenditure ban”139 and “catalogued the absence of 
evidence that corporate expenditures were being exchanged for legisla-
tive votes.”140 In accord with the same decidedly non-deferential 
evidentiary approach in Brown, Professor Huq characterized the ma-
jority’s tack in Citizens United as “a truly strict scrutiny standard,”141 
adding his own emphasis to the word strict. Professor Huq sums up 
Citizens United as reflecting “beady-eyed skepticism.”142 
Chief Justice John Roberts filed a concurring opinion in Citizens 
United that was joined by Justice Samuel Alito.143 Like Kennedy, the 
Chief Justice suggested that deference to congressional findings is 
essential when he quoted a concurrence authored eighty-five years 
earlier by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for the proposition that 
“[j]udging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is ‘the gravest 
and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform.’”144 
Yet Roberts, in supporting Justice Kennedy’s decision to go beyond 
the statutory issue—the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441b—and 
reach the larger question of whether Austin remained good law, 
bluntly wrote that “[t]here is a difference between judicial restraint 
and judicial abdication.”145 
Justice Kennedy, in Citizens United, found that deference could 
not stand in the way of striking down a statute that conflicted with 
long-standing First Amendment principles that provide political speech 
with heightened protection to serve enlightened self-government146 and 
the counterspeech tradition.147 Likewise, Chief Justice Roberts would  
139. Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 
112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 16, 23 (2012). 
140. Id. at 18–19.  
141. Id. at 18. 
142. Id. at 29.  
143. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
144. Id. at 917–18 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) 
(Holmes, J., concurring)). 
145. Id. at 919.  
146. See id. at 898 (majority opinion) (“Speech is an essential mechanism of 
democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the 
people. . . . The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use 
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-
government and a necessary means to protect it.” (citation omitted)). 
147. See generally Richards & Calvert, supra note 133 (discussing the 
counterspeech doctrine and providing examples of its use). 
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not let the deference counseled by the principle of stare decisis148 stop 
the Court from overruling a precedent in “Austin [that] threatens to 
subvert the ‘principled and intelligible’ development of our First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”149 Roberts was particularly concerned 
that the government in Citizens United was making new arguments to 
save Austin—arguments he contended depended “on radically recon-
ceptualizing [the Austin decision’s] reasoning”150 and that were never 
relied upon by the Austin Court to support its decision.151 For the 
Chief Justice, deference to past decisions was not due under stare 
decisis because  
[s]tare decisis is a doctrine of preservation, not transformation. 
It counsels deference to past mistakes, but provides no 
justification for making new ones. There is therefore no basis for 
the Court to give precedential sway to reasoning that it has 
never accepted, simply because that reasoning happens to 
support a conclusion reached on different grounds that have 
since been abandoned or discredited.152 
Ultimately, as Citizens United’s counsel James Bopp wrote in 
2011, the majority’s ruling stands for the following principle: “when 
evaluating laws in the First Amendment context, courts must 
determine whether legislative remedies comply with the Constitution, 
without deference to the legislature’s determination of the remedy’s 
constitutionality.”153 In accord with Professor’s Huq’s observation 
about the Court putting the “strict” in strict scrutiny in Citizens 
United,154 Bopp argued that the decision made it clear “courts owe no 
deference to the remedy the government chooses”155 in the First 
Amendment context and that under strict scrutiny, “the government 
must be put to its proof.”156 Similarly, Professor William D. Araiza 
 
148. Roberts, for instance, referred to “the special deference we accord to 
precedent.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 924 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring).  
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. See id. (“The Court in Austin nowhere relied upon the only arguments 
the Government now raises to support that decision.”). 
152. Id.  
153. James Bopp, Jr. et al., The Game Changer: Citizens United’s Impact on 
Campaign Finance Law in General and Corporate Political Speech in 
Particular, 9 First Amend. L. Rev. 251, 322 (2011) (emphasis added). 
154. Huq, supra note 139, at 18 (using Citizens United as an example of the 
Court applying “a truly strict scrutiny standard”). 
155. Bopp, supra note 153, at 331. 
156. Id.  
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wrote that Citizens United reflected “rigidity” in the Court’s “refusal 
to defer to congressional judgments relevant to the First Amendment 
issue.”157 
For some liberal-leaning constitutional scholars, this abject lack of 
deference to Congressional determinations in Citizens United is more 
than a little ironic because it reflects judicial activism by an 
ostensibly conservative Roberts Court. Constitutional law scholar 
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky captured this sentiment extremely well in a 
recent article: 
Citizens United should put to rest the constant conservative 
attack on judicial activism. By any measure, Citizens United 
was stunning in its judicial activism. The deference to the 
democratic process so often preached by conservatives in 
attacking liberal rulings protecting rights was nowhere in 
evidence as the conservative majority struck down restrictions 
on corporate spending that have existed for decades.158 
Illustrating the rift on deference among the Justices in Citizens 
United, Justice Stevens filed a lengthy dissent that, as Professor 
Araiza pointed out, “took issue with the majority’s rigidity”159 on 
what Araiza called “the deference point.”160 Professor Araiza con-
tended that Justice Stevens “provided a more nuanced discussion of 
the argument for deference to congressional findings about the 
corrupting effect of corporate and union speech.”161 
Justice Stevens, for instance, wrote that the Court “shows great 
disrespect for a coequal branch.”162 He derided the majority’s decision, 
opining at one point that “[r]ather than show any deference to a 
coordinate branch of Government, the majority thus rejects the 
anticorruption rationale without serious analysis. Today’s opinion 
provides no clear rationale for being so dismissive of Congress.”163 
Suggesting the majority’s non-deferential approach conflicted with its 
traditional tack, Stevens asserted that “[m]any of our campaign 
 
157. William D. Araiza, Citizens United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law 
Project: First Amendment Rules and Standards in Three Acts, 40 
Stetson L. Rev. 821, 822 (2011). 
158. Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court—October Term 2009 Foreword: 
Conservative Judicial Activism, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 863, 873 (2011).  
159. Araiza, supra note 157, at 827.  
160. Id.  
161. Id.  
162. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 940 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
163. Id. at 968 (footnote omitted). 
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finance precedents explicitly and forcefully affirm the propriety of 
such presumptive deference.”164 
The bottom line from Citizens United is a clear split on the 
deference owed to Congress when it adopts laws affecting political 
speech. While Justice Kennedy’s overt lack of deference to Congress is 
perhaps best encapsulated by his assertion that the First Amendment 
is “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power”165—in other words, 
a mistrust of legislative action that mandates ultra-strict scrutiny by 
the judiciary—Justice Stevens adopted a more deferential stance that 
would have upheld the stricken statute. 
D. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project:  
Divisions on Deference Granted to Congress 
 in the Name of National Security Stifles  Speech 
As with Citizens United, the 2010 case of Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project166 involved both political expression and a question of 
how much deference Congress deserves when adopting a law that 
allegedly violates the First Amendment. But unlike Citizens United, a 
majority of justices in Humanitarian Law Project gladly granted 
deference to Congress because of the presence of a variable decidedly 
not at stake in Citizens United—national security.  
Humanitarian Law Project (a case argued on behalf of the 
government by soon-to-be Justice Elena Kagan) involved an as-
applied, First Amendment-based challenge to the constitutionality of 
a federal statute167 prohibiting the giving of material support—
including “expert advice or assistance”168—to a foreign terrorist or-
ganization.169 The plaintiffs wanted to provide material support in the 
form of speech to two organizations, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(also known as the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan) and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam.170 The parties agreed that the Government’s 
interest in combating terrorism is urgent and of the highest order.171  
In authoring the majority opinion upholding the prohibition on 
material support to terrorist groups, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by 
 
164. Id. at 969. 
165. Id. at 898 (majority opinion). 
166. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
167. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).  
168. § 2339B(g)(4). 
169. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722 (observing that the 
Court had to “consider whether the material-support statute, as applied 
to plaintiffs, violates the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First 
Amendment”).  
170. Id. at 2713–14.  
171. Id. at 2724.  
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five colleagues,172 gave great deference to both Congress and the 
executive branch.173 Although making it clear deference in this area is 
neither absolute nor the same as judicial abdication,174 Roberts wrote, 
among other things: 
◦ “[E]valuation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress’s 
assessment, is entitled to deference. This litigation implicates 
sensitive and weighty interests of national security and 
foreign affairs.”175 
◦ “It is vital in this context ‘not to substitute . . . our own 
evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the 
Legislative Branch.’”176 
◦ “[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual 
inferences in this area, ‘the lack of competence on the part of 
the courts is marked,’ and respect for the Government’s 
conclusions is appropriate.”177 
◦ “In this area perhaps more than any other, the Legislature’s 
superior capacity for weighing competing interests means that 
‘we must be particularly careful not to substitute our 
judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress.’”178 
 
These bullet points indicate that deference is owed to Congress on 
national security issues because of its perceived expertise—its 
“superior capacity for weighing competing interests”179—and, con-
 
172. Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence 
Thomas, and Samuel Alito joined Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion. 
Id. at 2712.  
173. See id. at 2727 (“In analyzing whether it is possible in practice to 
distinguish material support for a foreign terrorist group’s violent 
activities and its nonviolent activities, we do not rely exclusively on our 
own inferences drawn from the record evidence. We have before us an 
affidavit stating the Executive Branch’s conclusion on that question.”). 
174. See id. (“[C]oncerns of national security and foreign relations do not 
warrant abdication of the judicial role. We do not defer to the 
Government’s reading of the First Amendment, even when such 
interests are at stake.”).  
175. Id. (emphasis added). 
176. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 
(1981)). 
177. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 
65). 
178. Id. at 2728 (emphasis added) (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68). 
179. Id.  
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versely, because of the Court’s own “lack of competence”180 in collect-
ing and evaluating evidence on such issues. The only inquiry left for 
the Court is to determine if Congress made a “reasonable 
evaluation”181 of the evidence.  
Deference in such situations is not surprising. As Professor George 
D. Brown recently wrote, a lawsuit like that in Humanitarian Law 
Project represents a “challenge[] to the government’s anti-terrorism 
policies. What is the proper role of the courts in such challenges? 
They inevitably produce calls for judicial deference in matters of na-
tional security, calls which are often heeded.”182 While deference is 
common in national security cases, Professor Peter Margulies nonethe-
less believed the Court went too far in Humanitarian Law Project, 
deriding its decision as “an unnecessary expansion of deference.”183 
In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts’s approach, Justice Breyer 
authored a dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, that 
openly criticized the majority’s deferential tack. Breyer, for instance, 
opined that while the majority “would defer strongly to Congress’ 
‘informed judgment,’”184 he found “no evidence that Congress has 
made such a judgment regarding the specific activities at issue in 
these cases.”185 Although conceding “the Government’s expertise in 
foreign affairs may warrant deference in respect to many matters,”186 
Breyer emphasized that “it remains for this Court to decide whether 
the Government has shown that such an interest justifies 
criminalizing speech activity otherwise protected by the First Amend-
ment.”187 Breyer encapsulated his views (and those of Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor) on deference in national security matters, writing that 
these cases require us to consider how to apply the First 
Amendment where national security interests are at stake. 
When deciding such cases, courts are aware and must respect 
the fact that the Constitution entrusts to the Executive and 
Legislative Branches the power to provide for the national 
 
180. Id. at 2727 (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68). 
181. Id. (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68). 
182. George D. Brown, Accountability, Liability, and the War on Terror—
Constitutional Tort Suits as Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 63 Fla. 
L. Rev. 193, 197 (2011). 
183. Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, 
and Freedom of Speech, 63 Hastings L.J. 455, 463 (2012).  
184. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
185. Id.  
186. Id. 
187. Id.  
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defense, and that it grants particular authority to the President 
in matters of foreign affairs. Nonetheless, this Court has also 
made clear that authority and expertise in these matters do not 
automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to secure the 
protection that the Constitution grants to individuals.188 
The deference problem illustrated by Humanitarian Law Project 
is obvious: both the majority and dissent claimed not to adopt all-or-
nothing, absolutist stances on deference regarding national security, 
yet they clearly diverged on where the proper metes and bounds of 
deference to Congress on national security interests lie when First 
Amendment speech interests are jeopardized. Deference thus is not a 
binary concept but, instead, is one with shades of gray that are 
seemingly adopted based on each Justice’s personal sensibilities about 
striking an appropriate balance between judicial abdication and 
judicial activism. 
E. Banks v. Beard: Disagreement on Deference Owed to  
Prison Officials in the Name of Serving Penological Interests 
The last time the Supreme Court directly addressed the First 
Amendment right of inmates to access media content was in 2006 in 
Beard v. Banks.189 Beard centered on a Pennsylvania prison policy 
prohibiting the most “specially dangerous and recalcitrant inmates”190 
from accessing any newspapers or magazines.191 Under the policy, the 
only media content these inmates may lawfully possess are “legal and 
personal correspondence, religious and legal materials, two library 
books, and writing paper.”192 
Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the judgment of the Court in a 
plurality opinion joined by three Justices.193 Two other Justices 
concurred in the judgment.194 Breyer explained that the basic, sub-
stantive principles governing the case were rooted in the Court’s 1987 
 
188. Id. at 2743. 
189. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (plurality opinion).  
190. Id. at 525. 
191. See id. at 526 (noting that, under the policy at issue for prisoners in 
Level 2 of Pennsylvania’s Long Term Segregation Unit, inmates “have 
no access to newspapers, magazines, or personal photographs”). 
192. Id.  
193. Id. at 524. Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court and 
delivered an opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Anthony Kennedy and David Souter joined. 
194. See id. at 536–42 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Clarence Thomas, 
joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, concurred only in the judgment, as he 
would uphold the restrictions based solely on the Eighth Amendment. 
Id. at 537. 
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opinion in Turner v. Safley195 and its 2003 decision in Overton v. 
Bazzetta.196 Synthesizing these two prisoner-rights cases, Breyer made 
four key points: (1) prisoners do possess First Amendment speech 
rights;197 (2) those rights, however, are not the same as those pos-
sessed by non-incarcerated individuals;198 (3) substantial deference 
must be granted to prison officials when evaluating restrictions on 
prisoners’ rights;199 and (4) the constitutional rights of prisoners may 
permissibly be abridged if they are reasonably related to legitimate 
penological concerns.200 
The Turner-based test deployed in Beard amounts to a very 
relaxed form of judicial scrutiny.201 The Court calls it a “reasonable-
ness standard,”202 in stark contrast to strict scrutiny,203 and legal 
commentators refer to it as “a rational basis standard of review.”204 
Professor Giovanna Shay asserts that the Turner test “emphasizes 
deference to prison officials and the relative technical and 
administrative expertise of corrections authorities.”205 
Expounding on the nature of the substantial deference owed to 
prison officials, Justice Breyer wrote that when it comes to “disputed 
 
195. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
196. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003). 
197. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 528 (“This Court recognized in Turner that 
imprisonment does not automatically deprive a prisoner of certain 
important constitutional protections, including those of the First 
Amendment.”). 
198. See id. (“[T]he Constitution sometimes permits greater restriction of 
such rights in a prison than it would allow elsewhere.”). 
199. See id. (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 132) (“[C]ourts owe ‘substantial 
deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators.’”). 
200. Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 87). 
201. See Matthew D. Rose, Comment, Prisoners and Public Employees: 
Bridges to a New Future in Prisoners’ Free Speech Retaliation Claims, 
5 Seventh Circuit Rev. 159, 160 (2009) (“Turner . . . established a 
very deferential rational basis standard of review.”). 
202. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409 (1989). The Court explained 
that the decision to use a reasonableness standard in Turner and 
subsequent cases “stemmed from its concern that . . . a strict standard 
simply was not appropriate for consideration of regulations that are 
centrally concerned with the maintenance of order and security within 
prisons.” Id. at 409–10. 
203. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining the strict scrutiny 
standard). 
204. Rose, supra note 201, at 170. 
205. Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 329, 
341 (2009). 
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matters of professional judgment,”206 the Court’s “inferences must 
accord deference to the views of prison authorities.”207 This reflects a 
trend of greater deference toward correctional administrators that 
emerged during the 1980s and 1990s.208 
The High Court’s test for measuring the validity of restrictions on 
inmates’ speech reflects deference because, unlike strict scrutiny, it 
requires a very low burden of proof—namely, whether or not the 
regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological 
concerns.209 Swapping out the word penological for pedagogical, this 
test mirrors the equally deferential test developed by the Court in 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 210 to address cases involving 
student speech that occurs as part of the curriculum or is school 
sponsored. As one commentator observed, “[t]he notion of reasonable 
relatedness employed in both tests gives wide berth to the enforcing 
authorities’ discretion, be it prison officials or school administrators, 
as compared to a hypothetically more stringent ‘directly related’ 
nexus requirement.”211 
Applying this deferential standard in Beard, Breyer and the 
plurality ruled for the Pennsylvania prison officials and their speech-
restrictive policy, opining that they “set forth adequate legal support 
for the policy. And the plaintiff, a prisoner who attacks the policy, 
has failed to set forth ‘specific facts’ that, in light of the deference 
that courts must show to the prison officials, could warrant a 
determination in his favor.”212 
In reaching this pro-censorship conclusion, Breyer pointed out 
that prison officials tendered multiple reasons for restricting access to 
reading materials,  
including the need to motivate better behavior on the part of 
particularly difficult prisoners, the need to minimize the amount 
of property they control in their cells, and the need to ensure 
 
206. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
207. Id.  
208. Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Prisoners’ Rights, 
17 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 83, 90 (2007). 
209. Beard, 548 U.S. at 528. 
210. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Hazelwood, 
the Court wrote that “[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment 
by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions 
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 273. 
211. Clay Calvert, Bylines Behind Bars: Fame, Frustration & First 
Amendment Freedom, 28 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 71, 98 (2008). 
212. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525 (emphasis added). 
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prison safety, by, for example, diminishing the amount of 
material a prisoner might use to start a cell fire.213 
Breyer determined that the first of these justifications—giving 
inmates enhanced incentives to rehabilitate their behavior by 
depriving them of media content—was adequate to support the ban 
and he went no further into the other interests.214 The ostensible 
incentive for good behavior, under the Pennsylvania policy, is that 
positive conduct eventually leads to “somewhat less severe 
restrictions, including the right to receive one newspaper and five 
magazines.”215 Justice Breyer thus reasoned that “[t]he articulated 
connections between newspapers and magazines, the deprivation of 
virtually the last privilege left to an inmate, and a significant 
incentive to improve behavior, are logical ones.”216 
Professor Christopher Smith labels the Beard plurality’s approach 
“an especially deferential application of an already-deferential test for 
violations of prisoners’ rights.”217 Another legal commentator goes 
even further: 
[T]he Court provided unprecedented deference in light of the 
serious deprivation involved. Accepting the administrations’ 
justification that prisoners should have limited access to reading 
materials to encourage better behavior and reduce the threat of 
violent or destructive behavior, the Court rolled over, leaving 
room for the great possibility that any fundamental right could 
be acceptably denied if justified by rehabilitation.218 
Justice Breyer and the plurality’s deferential approach in Beard 
drew pushback in the form of a dissent by Justice Ginsburg—a 
dissent that prompted Breyer to respond that “[c]ontrary to Justice 
Ginsburg’s suggestion, we do not suggest that the deference owed 
prison authorities makes it impossible for prisoners or others attacking 
a prison policy like the present one ever to succeed or to survive 
summary judgment. After all, the constitutional interest here is an 
important one.”219 The latter sentence, of course, is a reference to  
213. Id. at 530.  
214. See id. at 531 (“[W]e believe that the first rationale itself satisfies 
Turner’s requirements.”). 
215. Id. at 526. 
216. Id. at 531–32.  
217. Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme Court and Prisoners’ 
Rights, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 853, 881 (2011).  
218. Anna C. Burns, Note, Beard v. Banks: Restricted Reading, 
Rehabilitation, and Prisoners’ First Amendment Rights, 15 J.L. & 
Pol’y 1225, 1269 (2007) (emphasis added). 
219. Beard, 548 U.S. at 535 (citation omitted). 
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First Amendment interest in free speech, while the former seemingly 
represents an effort to blunt the charge that the plurality’s approach 
is so deferential as to completely cut off inmates’ possibilities of 
having any success under it. 
In her Beard dissent, Justice Ginsburg raised the specter of 
judicial abdication of duty by the plurality.220 In particular, she was 
concerned that the plurality’s deferential approach eclipsed eviden-
tiary assumptions traditionally made in favor of the non-moving party 
in summary judgment motions. She wrote that while notions of 
deference to prison officials “can and should be incorporated into the 
evaluation of a motion for summary judgment, that deference should 
come into play, pretrial, only after the facts shown are viewed in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all inferences are 
drawn in that party’s favor.”221 She explained: 
All inferences are to be drawn in favor of the prisoner opposing 
the regulation, and the question is not which side has the better 
argument, but whether the Secretary has shown he is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. By elevating the summary 
judgment opponent’s burden to a height prisoners lacking 
nimble counsel cannot reach, the plurality effectively tells prison 
officials they will succeed in cases of this order, and swiftly, 
while barely trying. It suffices for them to say, in our 
professional judgment the restriction is warranted.222 
In addition to Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens filed a dissent 
also intimating that the plurality’s approach was too deferential, at 
least in terms of scrutinizing the assertions and evidence set forth by 
Pennsylvania prison officials. In particular, Stevens called the eviden-
tiary support for Pennsylvania’s position “exceedingly tenuous. When 
the logical connection between prison officials’ stated interests and the 
restrictions on prisoners’ constitutional rights is not self-evident, we 
have considered whether prison officials proffered any evidence that 
their regulations served the values they identified.”223 It is important 
to recognize that Justice Stevens purported to apply the exact same 
test or rule as the plurality,224 but he gave far less hands-off deference 
when it came to evaluating the government’s evidence under the test. 
 
220. Id. at 554–55 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
221. Id. at 555. 
222.  Id. at 556. 
223. Id. at 550 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
224. See id. at 542 (noting that the reasonably related to legitimate 
penological concerns test was the correct rule to be applied “[w]hen a 
prison regulation impinges upon First Amendment freedoms”). 
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Justices Ginsburg and Stevens are not the only ones to criticize 
the plurality’s deferential approach in Beard. In a 2011 law journal 
article, Erwin Chemerinsky blasted Justice Breyer’s opinion: 
The Court’s deference to the government was stunning. This is a 
regulation that denies prisoners access to all newspapers, 
magazines, and even family photographs. It is hard to imagine a 
more extensive restriction of First Amendment rights. There 
was no evidence that this actually improves prisoner behavior, 
and in fact, the Court said that none was needed. The 
government’s assertion of a benefit was sufficient to justify the 
restriction on speech.225 
Ultimately, then, even when the Justices appear to agree in 
theory to apply the same legal rule—one that is itself already 
deferential—they nonetheless may disagree on the metes and bounds 
of that deference in practice. Deference in practice thus dirties the 
semantic hygiene that a seemingly clear sounding rational basis test 
like that in Beard appears to provide. Beard, in turn, illustrates that 
there can be both: (1) deferential applications of already deferential 
legal standards; and (2) more rigorous approaches to those same 
deferential standards.  
F. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.: Deferring to an 
Administrative Agency in the Realm of Indecency 
Under federal law,226 the Federal Communications Commission 
can fine227 over-the-air broadcasters for conveying indecent content, 
which it currently defines as “language or material that, in context, 
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual 
or excretory organs or activities.”228 Although the Supreme Court’s 
2009 ruling in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.229 did not reach 
the substantive First Amendment issues surrounding the FCC’s 
 
225. Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 723, 
728 (2011) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or 
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”).  
227. See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2006) (providing, in relevant part, that 
the FCC can issue a maximum forfeiture penalty of $325,000 for each 
violation for broadcasting obscene, indecent, or profane language). 
228. Guide: Obscenity, Indecency and Profanity, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/ 
guides/obscenity-indecency-and-profanity (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).  
229. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox I ), 556 U.S. 502 (2009).  
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broadcast indecency policies230—and the Court again dodged the First 
Amendment issues in 2012231—the majority nonetheless engaged in an 
exceedingly deferential review under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) in upholding the Commission’s ability to change its 
indecency policy and, in the process, to further limit the speech rights 
of broadcasters. Under the FCC’s new policy, the lack of repetition of 
an expletive “is not a safe harbor”232 for broadcasters, and the FCC 
can instead enforce its policy against “isolated or fleeting broad-
casts”233 of indecent language. Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
the FCC failed to provide a reasoned explanation for justifying its 
about-face in suddenly targeting fleeting expletives after years of 
having not done so.234 
In delivering the opinion of the Court in the FCC’s favor, Justice 
Scalia explained the deferential approach—what he called a 
“narrow”235 standard of review—that the Justices must take under the 
APA. In particular, they will only reverse an agency’s policy change if 
its decision was arbitrary or capricious,236 a statutorily mandated 
standard of review.237 For the Scalia majority, this meant that the 
 
230. See id. at 516, 529 (declining “to address the constitutional questions,” 
and adding that the change to the FCC’s indecency policy “is a separate 
question to be addressed in a constitutional challenge”). 
231. After the Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the APA issue, the 
Second Circuit found the FCC regulations impermissibly vague under 
the First Amendment. 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010). The Court again 
granted certiorari, this time “for decision on the constitutional 
question.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox II ), 132 S. Ct. 
2307 (2012). The Court determined in Fox II that FCC’s abrupt about-
face on fleeting expletives and brief nudity failed to provide the 
broadcasters with sufficient notice, and the FCC’s standards were 
therefore unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 
2320. Because the Court struck down the FCC’s indecency policy on 
Fifth Amendment grounds, the Court refrained from addressing the 
First Amendment implications of the policy. Id. 
232. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 512.  
233. Id. at 509.  
234. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 455 (2d Cir. 
2007) (“The Networks contend that the Remand Order is arbitrary and 
capricious because the FCC has made a 180-degree turn regarding its 
treatment of ‘fleeting expletives’ without providing a reasoned 
explanation justifying the about-face. We agree.”), vacated, 556 U.S. 502 
(2009). 
235. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 513.  
236. Id.  
237. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (providing that a court can hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 
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FCC’s predictive judgments about what might happen to the use of 
expletives in the broadcast medium if its policy did not change 
“merits deference,”238 and the FCC 
need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons 
for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it 
suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, 
that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes 
it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately 
indicates. This means that the agency need not always provide 
a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new 
policy created on a blank slate.239 
One highlight from Justice Scalia’s Fox I opinion illustrates the 
vast deference given to the FCC and, perhaps more importantly, 
provides a stark contrast with his decidedly non-deferential approach 
on the proof-of-harm question in Brown.240 In particular, Scalia con-
tended in Fox I that 
[t]here are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence 
can be marshaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity 
on children is one of them. One cannot demand a multiyear 
controlled study, in which some children are intentionally 
exposed to indecent broadcasts (and insulated from all other 
indecency), and others are shielded from all indecency.241 
The only evidence necessary to support the FCC’s position was, 
in Scalia’s view, common sense: “Here it suffices to know that children 
mimic the behavior they observe—or at least the behavior that is 
presented to them as normal and appropriate. Programming replete 
with one-word indecent expletives will tend to produce children who 
use (at least) one-word indecent expletives.”242 Justice Scalia’s view 
about the non-necessity of empirical proof of harm fits neatly with the 
Supreme Court’s observation in the obscenity243 case of Paris Adult 
 
be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law”).  
238. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 521 (“[E]ven in the absence of evidence, the agency’s 
predictive judgment (which merits deference) makes entire sense. To 
predict that complete immunity for fleeting expletives, ardently desired 
by broadcasters, will lead to a substantial increase in fleeting expletives 
seems to us an exercise in logic rather than clairvoyance.”).  
239. Id. at 515.  
240. See supra Part II.A. 
241. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 519. 
242. Id. 
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Theatre I v. Slaton that “[f]rom the beginning of civilized societies, leg-
islators and judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions.” 244 
Counterposed to such a deferential evidentiary tack, Justice 
Breyer dissented in Fox I. He concluded the FCC’s change in policy 
to target fleeting expletives was, in fact, arbitrary and capricious.245 
Illustrating his rigorous approach to the APA’s facially deferential 
standard, Justice Breyer called attention to the First Amendment 
interests at stake that, in his view, should have been factored into the 
FCC’s change-of-policy calculus: 
[T]he FCC said next to nothing about the relation between the 
change it made in its prior “fleeting expletive” policy and the 
First-Amendment-related need to avoid “censorship,” a matter 
as closely related to broadcasting regulation as is health to that 
of the environment. The reason that discussion of the matter is 
particularly important here is that the FCC had explicitly rested 
its prior policy in large part upon the need to avoid treading too 
close to the constitutional line.246 
This observation is important because Breyer suggested that even 
when a transparently deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard of 
review is deployed, it must be implemented in a rigorous fashion when 
First Amendment interests are at stake. Furthermore, agencies must 
provide courts with much more detailed explanations for their 
changes in policy, with Justice Breyer observing that 
the FCC’s answer to the question, “Why change?” is, “We like 
the new policy better.” This kind of answer, might be perfectly 
satisfactory were it given by an elected official. But when given 
by an agency, in respect to a major change of an important 
policy where much more might be said, it is not sufficient.247 
Justice Breyer thus concluded that the Second Circuit was correct 
in Fox Television Stations that the FCC’s policy switch on indecency 
did, in fact, violate the APA.248 Ultimately, as Professor Robin  
243. Obscene expression is not protected by the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of free speech. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 
U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (“We have repeatedly held that the protection of 
the First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech.”); Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“[O]bscenity is not within the 
area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”). 
244. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (emphasis 
added).  
245. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
246. Id. at 553.  
247. Id. at 567.  
248. Id. 
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Kundis Craig wrote, Fox I “leaves federal courts with multiple rules 
for how to approach arbitrary-and-capricious review when a federal 
agency changes policy.”249 Deference granted to the FCC led to a pro-
censorship result, just as it did in Morse, Beard, and Humanitarian 
Law Project. 
Conclusion 
This Article deployed deference as a lens for analyzing a half-
dozen decisions by the Roberts Court affecting free expression. Using 
this data set of factually diverse cases, the Article illustrated how 
varying conceptions and standards of deference affect First Amend-
ment rights in different circumstances and contexts.  
Furthermore, the Article demonstrated the pliant nature of 
deference and the related disagreements among the Justices over when 
and how much deference should be afforded in any given case. 
Perhaps most significantly, this Article revealed how the Justices 
differed on deference in several high-profile First Amendment cases 
including Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, Morse v. 
Frederick, Citizens United v. FEC, and Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project. That quintet of cases illustrates disparate views on deference 
toward: 
◦ social scientists; 
◦ public school administrators;  
◦ Congress; and 
◦ an administrative agency (the FCC). 
Even in cases not so visible to the public, such as the prison 
speech case of Beard v. Banks, there are disagreements among the 
Justices on deference. Indeed, the split in Beard suggests that what 
purports to be a deferential standard of review to start with can be 
applied in either an exceedingly deferential or minimally deferential 
fashion. 
Encapsulating the findings from the six cases examined here, the 
majority or plurality’s denial of (or reduced level of) deference led to 
free speech victories in Brown (denial of deference to social scientists 
resulted in striking down California’s violent video game statute) and 
Citizens United (denial of deference to Congress resulted in striking 
down federal rules limiting the political speech rights of corporations 
and unions). In contrast, the deference granted to Congress in 
 
249. Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes: 
The Deference Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 Emory L.J. 
1, 40 (2011).  
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Humanitarian Law Project, to prison officials in Beard, to educators 
in Morse, and to the FCC in Fox I all resulted in pro-censorship 
outcomes.  
Deference, of course, is merely one lens through which to filter 
First Amendment-based cases. This Article, however, laid bare the 
pivotal role deference can play in a case’s outcome. Like a spigot, 
deference can be turned on and off by the Court, and even when it is 
turned on, it can be made either to flow freely and with full force or it 
can be reduced to a mere trickle. It is precisely such subjectivity and 
flexibility that makes it a critical concept to understand. Deference 
amounts to a judicial wildcard, as it were, that justices can employ—
regardless of whether they claim to be applying strict scrutiny,250 
intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review—to help sustain a law’s 
constitutionality. Merely claiming to apply strict scrutiny, for in-
stance, does not necessarily result in rigorous judicial review if 
deference is factored into the equation. The bottom line is that 
deference is an elastic concept that muddies judicial analysis and 
sacrifices First Amendment rights when deployed in large doses. 
Given the disparities among the Justices on the Roberts Court 
regarding deference in First Amendment-based controversies, as illus-
trated in this Article, it is apparent that deference, as a concept, is 
too loosely bandied about and trotted out on an as-needed basis, 
rather than being used with consistency, predictability, and analytical 
rigor. This is particularly troublesome because failing to bestow any 
deference on an entity like Congress can lead to charges of judicial 
activism251 that seriously undermine the Court’s legitimacy. Con-
versely, being perceived as overly deferential can result in perhaps 
equally damning allegations of judicial abdication.252  
How can one explain the differences in deference across the 
various First Amendment cases addressed here? It is not always 
necessary. For example, perhaps the greater deference afforded to 
public school officials by the majority in Morse, as compared to the 
lack of deference given to social scientists by the majority in Brown, 
can be parsed in several ways. First, public school principals and 
administrators are, like the Justices themselves, government officials 
tasked with a specific governmental leadership role. The deference 
may thus be explained, in part, as a natural conferral of respect, 
 
250. The notion of applying deference in the strict scrutiny context seems 
oxymoronic—strictly deferential?—but it exists. See Ozan O. Varol, 
Strict in Theory, but Accommodating in Fact?, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 1243, 
1256–58 (2010) (describing the majority’s mix of strict scrutiny and 
deference in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).  
251. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 158, at 867 (discussing the current 
judicial activism of the Court). 
252. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s 
negative view of judicial deference).  
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esteem, and expertise from one governmental official to another. And 
although social scientists may be experts in their fields and also may 
be government employees (if they work at state-related universities), 
they need not be government employees (if they work at private 
universities or corporations or think tanks). Furthermore, even when 
social scientists are government employees of public universities, their 
roles as social scientists are not those of government officials tasked 
with leadership responsibility on a scale with public school admin-
istrators who are in charge of hundreds and sometimes thousands of 
students, teachers, and others. 
Second, educators’ decisions necessarily entail subjective judgment 
calls about when student speech should be censored. In contrast, 
social scientists—at least those whose work was at issue in Brown—
deal in the world of empirical facts. The former realm, given its 
inherent murkiness and the need for quick, on-the-fly decision making 
when a speech crisis arises unexpectedly on campus, demands more 
deference than the latter realm, which purports to objectively measure 
outcomes, in highly controlled situations, with statistical significance. 
In other situations, the authors of this Article posit that there 
may be latent assumptions—assumptions hidden behind the typical 
reasons for granting deference of perceived expertise and knowledge—
about why deference actually is granted. For instance, in both Morse 
and Beard the individuals impacted by the bestowal of deference on, 
respectively, school officials and prison administrators are, for all 
intents and purposes, second-class First Amendment citizens253—
namely, minors and prisoners. Put differently, it may be easier to 
grant deference to would-be censors in these scenarios because the 
classes of individuals whose speech rights are gored in the process are 
perceived as somehow less worthy of receiving full First Amendment 
protection. Similarly, negatively affecting the speech rights of a non-
profit human rights group like the Humanitarian Law Project254 may 
seem like a small price to pay for providing deference that safeguards 
more than 300 million people in the name of national security.  
 
253. This term has been used by others to describe the judicial treatment 
under the First Amendment of both broadcasters and the purveyors of 
commercial speech. See Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, 
Contrasting Concurrences of Clarence Thomas: Deploying Originalism 
and Paternalism in Commercial and Student Speech Cases, 26 Ga. St. 
U. L. Rev. 321, 323 n.19 (2010) (describing uses of the phrase “second-
class First Amendment citizens”).  
254. The group describes itself as “a non-profit organization founded in 1985, 
dedicated to protecting human rights and promoting the peaceful 
resolution of conflict by using established international human rights 
laws and humanitarian law.” Humanitarian L. Project, http://hlp. 
home.igc.org (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).  
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A final point is important: Chief Justice Roberts has been highly 
successful in some extremely controversial First Amendment-based 
cases, such as United States v. Stevens255 and Snyder v. Phelps,256 in 
bringing together nearly all of his colleagues in rendering pro-speech 
decisions. As Chief Justice, Roberts should find it equally important—
certainly for purposes of adding clarity and consistency to judicial 
decision making, and perhaps more selfishly for securing his own 
legacy—to try to bring the Justices together on conceptions of 
deference. Without consistency across the Justices on deference, 
standards such as strict scrutiny lose clarity. For example, if two 
Justices both purport to apply strict scrutiny, but one embraces 
deference for the governmental entity that proposed the law in 
question and the other does not, it is hard to claim they are, in fact, 
using the same strict scrutiny test. 
Ultimately, the cliché goes that the devil is in the details. If that 
is the case, then deference certainly is the devil in the details of 
judicial analysis that plagues clarity and predictability in a diverse 
range of First Amendment-based scenarios under the Roberts Court.  
 
255. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). Justice Samuel Alito 
found himself isolated in Stevens from his eight colleagues on the Court 
as the lone dissenting justice. Id. at 1592–1602 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
256. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). Justice Samuel Alito was 
isolated in Snyder from his eight colleagues on the Court as the solitary 
dissenter. Id. at 1222–29 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
  
  
 
   
